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主题: [转帖]摩根斯坦利:量化寬鬆政策不會威脅美元
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作者 [转帖]摩根斯坦利:量化寬鬆政策不會威脅美元   
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文章标题: [转帖]摩根斯坦利:量化寬鬆政策不會威脅美元 (1160 reads)      时间: 2009-3-11 周三, 11:04   

作者:pirate海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com

來源:摩根斯坦利,2008.11.28,作者:Stephen Jen ,Spyros Andreopoulos


提要:美聯儲開始實施量化寬鬆的貨幣政策,市場擔心這種非常規政策會影響到美元。本文認為,一方面,量化寬鬆措施僅會影響美元的名義價值,其發揮影響力的途徑是美國相對通脹率的變化。鋻於歐洲央行和英格蘭銀行也將實行量化寬鬆舉措,美元未必會受到不利影響。另一方面,迫使美聯儲採取量化寬鬆舉措的動因在於美國金融基本面的惡化,該因素將損害美元的實際價值。考慮兩方面因素,未來6個月之中,在全球去杠桿化進程的推動下,美元將繼續對主要貨幣升值,但幅度不大,而後將有所回落,同時對新興市場貨幣仍將大幅升值。

  (外腦精華·北京)美聯儲已開始實施“量化寬鬆”的貨幣政策。本文分析了定量寬鬆的概念,以及這種非常規政策對美元的影響。我們的結論是,包括量化寬鬆在內,貨幣政策操作僅會影響名義變數,而不會對美元的實際價值產生明顯影響。一方面,如果量化寬鬆改變了美國的中期通脹前景,就會影響美元的名義價值;另一方面,美聯儲的量化寬鬆是否會導致美元貶值還取決於其他央行的舉措。鋻於歐洲央行和英格蘭銀行也將採取量化寬鬆舉措,美元未必會受到不利影響。

  雖然量化寬鬆自身僅會通過相對通脹率和通脹預期影響美元的名義價值,但迫使美聯儲實施量化寬鬆的內在結構性問題卻會改變美元相對於其他貨幣的實際價值。從理論上說,美國金融體系的危險狀況本應通過美元貶值表現出來。近期美元之所以持續升值,原因在於,在當前的去杠桿化時期,主要儲備貨幣的地位支援了美元。美國財政赤字的擴大將對美元的內在價值構成進一步的壓力。

  總之,在名義匯率層面上,美聯儲的量化寬鬆對美元的影響取決於美國的相對通脹前景及其對通脹預期的影響。但就實際匯率而言,美元的內在價值確實會因其金融業受到的重創而下跌。我們仍然認為,在世界經濟減速的過程中(這個階段至少將持續到明年夏季),美元將繼續升值,但在去杠桿化過程結束、而且事實證明美國的經濟復蘇將比其他經濟體更艱難之後,美元將出現一定幅度的貶值。由於美國經濟基本面的惡化,未來幾個月之中,美元升值對主要貨幣升值的幅度將小于我們先前的預期。另一方面,我們仍然認為,美元仍將對新興市場貨幣大幅升值。

  量化寬鬆的經驗與現實

  面對通脹率下滑、失業率攀升的局面,在聯邦基金利率逼近零點的情況下,美聯儲很可能會依靠量化寬鬆政策來維持刺激性貨幣政策。總體而言,央行可以通過兩種方式放鬆銀根:改變貨幣價格(即利率)或改變貨幣數量。多年以來,正統的貨幣政策一直以前一個政策杠桿為中心。然而,隨著通脹率回落、短期名義利率逼近零點,從原則上說,央行可以後一種方式、即數量杠桿來實施擴張性貨幣政策。影響經濟活動的是實際利率而非名義利率。如果經濟處於通縮狀態,那麼即使名義利率為零,實際利率也會保持正值。2000年日本面臨的情況就是如此--名義利率已降至零點,但在實際利率為正值的情況下,低迷的貨幣需求仍不足以令貨幣政策發揮效力。這就是過去所說的“流動性陷阱”。

  然而,目前美國、歐元區和英國的情況卻有所不同,它們的名義利率仍未降至零點。這種情況下,貨幣政策面臨的主要問題並不是通縮和貨幣需求不足、即總需求問題,儘管如果需求進一步減速,就可能出現這個問題。當前的貨幣政策之所以缺乏效力,主要原因在於短期政策利率對貨幣總量、信貸和總需求的傳導機制已經失效。因此,日本是在零利率的情況下實行了量化寬鬆政策,而美國、歐元區和英國在沒有達到零利率的情況下就實行了量化寬鬆。

  央行放鬆銀根的非常規方式主要有三種。第一,央行可以通過與外界溝通或量化寬鬆等方式,培養短期利率將長期保持低位的預期。事實上,2001年3月-2006年3月,日本央行實行量化寬鬆政策的主要目的就在於此。再如,2003年8月,美聯儲公開市場委員會在公報中稱“適應性政策將維持相當長的時間”也是此類放鬆銀根承諾的事例。第二,央行可以擴大其資產負債表的規模,以左右通脹預期。目前,美聯儲的資產負債表規模已由8月的9000億美元升至2萬億美元左右。從這個角度看,美聯儲通過“印鈔票”實行量化寬鬆的做法是顯而易見的。第三,央行可以改變其資產負債表的結構。如果投資者將不同資產視為非完全替代品,央行買進特定資產的操作就會對資產價格產生明顯影響。就此而言,最好的例子就是長期美國國債。從理論上說,美聯儲可以大規模買進美國國債,以抑制收益率上升;日本央行在實行量化寬鬆政策期間,就曾進行這種操作。上述三種量化寬鬆的方式雖然概念不同,但在操作上可以相互替代。隨著美國經濟進一步減速,我們預計美聯儲將運用所有這三種非常規方式。

  2008年9月,美聯儲開始擴大其資產負債表。聯儲採取量化寬鬆的目的有兩方面。一是買進市場上的證券,以圖“啟動”銀行體系;二是承擔私人部門所不願承擔的一部分金融仲介職能。在日本央行實行量化寬鬆政策的2001年3月-2006年3月間,其資產負債表對該國GDP的比率由13%左右升至22%左右。由於美日兩國金融體系的根本性差異,美聯儲資產負債表的規模遠小于日本央行——本次危機前,前者的資產負債表對美國GDP的比率僅為6%左右。到10月份,美聯儲資產負債表已擴大到美國GDP的8%以上,比危機前增長了35%。

  要正確地估價聯儲“印鈔”對通脹的影響,關鍵在於觀察廣義貨幣總量的變化,以及“貨幣乘數”的變化。我們比較了日、美兩國M2的變化軌跡。在日本實行量化寬鬆政策時期,該國的M2貨幣供應量從GDP的125%左右增至140%以上。就美國而言,9 月份至今,M2貨幣供應量已經由GDP的53%增至57%。不過,雖然近期美國的M2增勢迅猛,但當前的M2/GDP比率並未大大超過2003年的水準,當時美聯儲將聯邦基金利率降至1.00%的低點。事實上,近期M2/ GDP比率大幅上升的主要原因在於美國4季度名義GDP的急劇下滑。總而言之,8月份至今,雖然基礎貨幣猛增了34%,但M2僅增長了2.7%。

  基礎貨幣和廣義貨幣供應量走勢之所以出現嚴重背離,原因自然在於“貨幣乘數”的急劇下降。而貨幣乘數暴跌又反映出,自危機發生以來,美國銀行及其他金融機構承擔資本仲介功能的能力和意願都大為萎縮。當前美國貨幣乘數下降的嚴重程度大大超過了當年的日本:日本方面,貨幣乘數由資產負債表的10倍左右降至最低點的6.5倍左右,降幅為35%;而在美國,僅僅過去2個月之中,貨幣乘數就從9以上降至7左右,降幅已達22%。

  量化寬鬆對美元影響有限

  那麼,美聯儲的量化寬鬆政策是否會打擊美元?簡單說,我們的回答是否定的。但這個回答能否成立,還要取決於很多假設。首先,通縮壓力是不可忽視的。雖然分析師對通脹與通縮之爭可以有不同的觀點,但令人擔憂的是,迄今為止,全球決策者依然未能遏制金融危機。認為美國或其他地區不會發生通縮的觀點是難以令人信服的。出現持續的通縮的可能性雖然不高,但也遠沒有低到令人高枕無憂的程度。雖然與當年的日本央行相比,美聯儲近期的行動要迅速得多,但可以說,美國的問題也比當年的日本更嚴重,而且本次金融危機已經重創了貨幣乘數,從而迫使美聯儲代替私人部門承擔了融資功能。簡言之,當今的通縮風險比未來的通脹風險更令人擔憂,因為我們不敢肯定,我們面臨的僅僅是通縮“恐慌”。

  我們認為,在通脹和通縮兩項風險中,美聯儲和其他發達國家央行更加擔憂後者,其放鬆銀根的舉措就反映了這一點。比較而言,新興市場央行則更擔心通脹風險。

  投資者已經認識到這種情況,他們下注于七國集團央行能夠控制通縮風險。這種情況下,七國集團過度放鬆的風險就超出了其無法啟動經濟的風險。換言之,央行越擔心通縮,就會採取越有力的措施,因而危機過後出現通脹的風險也就越大。

  美元是否會貶值,取決於投資者是否認為中期之內美國的通脹走勢是否會失控。我們認為,幾乎可以肯定,美聯儲有足夠的時間回收通過量化寬鬆投放的貨幣,從而保持對通脹的控制。假設其他條件相同,只要不出現通脹,美元就不會受到打擊。雖然流動性陷阱難以應對,但如果宏觀經濟形勢恢復正常,那麼對美聯儲而言,消除貨幣刺激措施的影響並非難事。當然,上述分析也表明,關鍵在於,在量化寬鬆階段過後,美聯儲是否有能力消除其影響。

  此外,雖然目前很多人僅僅關注著美聯儲的量化寬鬆舉措和美元,但要不了多久,歐洲的央行很可能也會被迫採取同樣的舉措。正像美國銀行也一樣,歐洲大陸和英國的銀行體系也不願承擔資本仲介功能。因此,正如美聯儲一樣,歐洲央行和英格蘭銀行很可能也會被迫代替私人金融部門承擔一部分金融仲介職能。這樣,在美聯儲、歐洲央行和英格蘭都採取量化寬鬆舉措的情況下,歐元-美元匯率或英鎊-美元匯率存在極大不確定性,而不像一些僅僅關注美聯儲的投資者所認為的那樣,歐元和英鎊必定會對美元升值。

  值得指出的是,擔憂通縮者與擔憂通脹者的爭論意味著一種倒置的美元微笑曲線。我們的美元微笑曲線理論認為,在美國經濟走勢強于或弱於世界經濟的其他部分時,美元將升值;在二者之間的中間情形下,美元將貶值。而通縮與通脹之爭卻意味著,在上述兩種極端情形下美元將走弱,而在中間情形下美元將走強。

  基本面惡化將打擊美元內在價值

  美聯儲的“量化寬鬆”操作會通過通脹影響到美元的名義價值,而美國金融體系的嚴重惡化則必然會損害美元的內在價值。我們再次強調,匯率是一個相對概念,因此我們需要關注美國之外發達國家的金融體系受到了多麼嚴重的結構性損害,以及此類損害給這些國家造成的財政負擔。就此而言,雖然美國銀行體系的問題很嚴重,但相對而言,美國銀行業資產負債表的規模卻遠小于許多其他發達國家。以銀行業負債對GDP的比率為例,瑞士的數字是650%,英國是430%,歐元區是320%,日本是150%,而美國只有85%。投資者應記住這一事實。

  為了衡量美國金融動蕩及官方應對舉措對於美元匯率指數的影響,我們用多邊美元指數公允價值框架進行了模擬,預測了相對生產率、相對貿易條件、相對財政狀況以及美國海外凈資產等4項指標的變化對美元匯率指數的定量影響,重點是後2項指標的影響,因為我們認為,銀行業與相對生產率和相對貿易條件兩項指標間難以找到明確的關聯。

  根據近期動向判斷,一方面,美國的相對財政狀況將惡化2%;另一方面,雖然美國經常項目赤字可望進一步下降,但其絕對規模仍然很大,因此美國海外凈資產對GDP的比率將下降3%。這兩個因素將使美元指數的公允價值下跌5.3%。

  總而言之,要評估美聯儲的量化寬鬆舉措對美元的影響,需要考慮兩個因素。首先,量化寬鬆舉措本身通過相對通脹率的變化,只會影響美元的名義價值。量化寬鬆導致的通脹壓力越大,美元貶值的壓力也就越大。第二,迫使美聯儲實施量化寬鬆舉措的根本原因、即美國金融體系受到的打擊將使得美元的內在價值下跌5%-7%.因此,雖然我們仍然預計,在全球經濟低迷的背景下,美元有所升值,但未來6個月之中,美元對其他主要貨幣升值的幅度將小于我們先前的預測。另一方面,未來6個月之中,美元將對新興市場貨幣大幅升值。

  英文原文:The Fed’s QE Operations and the Dollar

Summary and Conclusions

The Fed has commenced QE (quantitative easing). In this note, we review the concept of QE and analyse the likely impact of this extraordinary operation on the dollar. The upshot is that, since monetary policy, including QE, is a ‘nominal’ operation, the operation itself should not have significant implications for the real value of the dollar. The nominal dollar value should, thus, only be affected if QE alters the outlook of inflation in the US over the medium term. Also, whether QE by the Fed should erode the value of the dollar should be assessed relative to what other central banks do. To the extent that the ECB and the BoE also conduct QE - which is the case - the impact of QE on the dollar is not necessarily negative.

Having said this, though QE per se should affect the dollar through relative inflation as well as inflation expectations, the underlying structural problems that forced the Fed to conduct QE in the first place should alter the fundamental value of the dollar, relative to those of other currencies. The parlous state of the US financial system should, in theory, be reflected in a lower value of the dollar, had it not been for its hegemonic reserve currency status propping the dollar up during this deleveraging phase. The bloated fiscal deficits (which we assume will exceed those of the G7 countries) will further weigh on the intrinsic value of the dollar.

In sum, whether QE by the Fed is negative for the dollar depends on the inflation outlook of the US and the resulting inflation expectations. But at a fundamental level, the dollar's intrinsic value has indeed deteriorated with its severely weakened financial sector. We maintain our core view that the dollar should continue to appreciate as the world slows - which we assume will last until next summer - but could give back some of the gains when deleveraging stops and the recovery phase for the US economy proves to be more protracted and treacherous than for other economies. The size and vigour of the dollar rally against the majors in the next six months or so are also likely to be more tempered than we have had in mind, in light of the deteriorating fundamentals in the US. Our call on EM currencies remains unchanged.

Background Discussion on QE

As inflation falls, and the unemployment rate rises, the Fed is likely to embark on QE to sustain monetary stimulus even when the FFR approaches zero. Broadly speaking, central banks can ease by either altering the price of money (i.e., interest rates) or the quantity of money. While policy orthodoxy these days is focused on the former lever, when short-term nominal interest rates approach zero as inflation falls, central banks could in principle use quantitative channels through which to impart monetary stimulus. Since it is the real interest rate that affects economic activities, the zero bound on nominal interest rates exposes an economy with deflation to persistently positive real interest rates. This was the situation faced by Japan in 2000, that interest rates were cut to zero but there was still not enough demand for money for monetary policy to work. That was an old-fashioned case of a 'liquidity trap'.

However, for the US, Europe and the UK, the current situation is somewhat different. Interest rates are still above zero. The problem monetary authorities face is not quite deflation and inadequate demand for money (i.e., a deficient aggregate demand problem) – though this problem could emerge if demand slows further. Rather, monetary policies lack traction mainly because there is no longer a smooth transmission mechanism from the short-term policy interest rates to broader monetary aggregates, credit and aggregate demand. As a result, Japan had QE with ZIRP, but in the US, Euroland and the UK, there is QE without ZIRP.

There are essentially three broad channels through which a central bank can conduct unconventional monetary easing. First, a central bank could ‘do things’ (i.e., through communications or QE) to foster the expectation that short-term interest rates will stay low for an extended period of time. Indeed, this was the primary aim of the BoJ during its QE episode between March 2001 and March 2006. The FOMC statement in August 2003 which stated for the first time that "policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period” is another example of this type of commitment to monetary easing. Second, a central bank could increase the size of its balance sheet to foster an expectation on the future path of inflation. (Currently, the Fed’s balance sheet is around US$2 trillion, up from US$900 billion in August.) The intuition of this ‘money printing’ method of QE is obvious. Third, a central bank could alter the composition of its balance sheet. Assuming that investors treat different assets as not perfect substitutes, central banks' purchase operations of selected assets could materially alter their prices. The best example is long-term US Treasuries. In theory, the Fed could purchase large amounts of Treasuries to cap the yields, just as the BoJ did through its rinban operations during the QE period. These three different methods of QE are conceptually distinct but operationally fungible. As the US economy slows further, we expect that the Fed will put all three methods of unconventional easing into practice.

The Fed began expanding its balance sheet in September. It may be useful to consider two motivations for QE by the Fed. The first is to take on market securities in an attempt to 'jump-start' the banking system; the second is to take on some of the intermediation duties that the private sector has refused to conduct. We looked at how the expansion in the Fed's balance sheet compares with the experience of the BoJ during the QE period that spanned from March 2001 to March 2006, during which time the BoJ’s balance sheet expanded from around 13% of GDP to about 22% (we measure the balance sheet by the monetary base for both countries). Due to fundamental differences in the financial systems of the two countries, the Fed’s balance sheet has historically been substantially smaller than that of the BoJ - it averaged around 6% of GDP prior to this crisis. By October, however, the Fed's balance sheet had been expanded to more than 8% of GDP - a 35% increase.

To properly assess the impact of 'money printing' by the Fed on inflation, it is important to track the evolution of broader monetary aggregates, and observe how the 'money multiplier' - the ratio between broad money and the Fed's balance sheet - changes over time. We looked at the trajectories for M2 of Japan and the US. During Japan's QE period, its M2 expanded from around 125% of GDP to more than 140%. In the US, M2 has expanded from 53% to 57% of GDP since September. While the latter is a sharp surge, M2/GDP is not substantially higher than it was during 2003, when the Fed drove the FFR towards 1.00%. Indeed, most of the surge in the figure comes from the anticipated sharp drop in 4Q nominal GDP. To summarise, while base money has increased dramatically (by 34% since August), M2 has grown by only 2.7%.

The reason for this, of course, is that the ‘money multiplier’ (MM) has collapsed, reflecting a severe breakdown in the ability and the willingness of the bank and non-bank entities in the US to intermediate capital to the extent they had done prior to the crisis. The collapse in the US MM is significantly more severe than in the case of Japan, during which time Japan’s MM fell from around 10 times the size of the BoJ’s balance sheet to around 6.5 times (a fall of 35%). In the US in the last two months, we have seen the US MM falling from more than 9 to around 7 (down 22%).

Will QE by the Fed Weaken the Dollar?

Our short answer is ‘no’. But whether this answer is right depends on a number of assumptions. (1) Deflationary pressures cannot be dismissed so easily in this cycle. Analysts can have their views on the inflation/deflation debate; however, to us, the fact that, with half a dozen ‘nuclear options’, the world’s policymakers have not yet succeeded at halting or containing the crisis worries us. It is, to us, very difficult to argue convincingly that ‘it’ won’t happen in the US or elsewhere in the world (see Vice Chairman Don Kohn’s speech last week). While the probability of this risk of sustained deflation is not high, it may be too high for comfort. Though the Fed did act much sooner than the BoJ, the underlying problem is arguably more serious and the financial crisis has severely shocked the 'money multiplier', forcing the Fed to intermediate on behalf of the private sector. In short, we fear deflation now more than we fear inflation tomorrow, because we simply have no confidence that this will merely be a 'deflation scare'.

Our guess is that the Fed and other developed country central banks have a similar asymmetry in fear of the two tail risks: this risk-management approach to monetary easing indeed reflects the asymmetry. (EM central banks have lingering concerns about inflation.) In a way, investors realise this and are betting on the G7 central bankers to overwhelm and neutralise the left tail risk, leaving the risk of the G7 ‘overdoing’ (i.e., over-easing) it more prominent than the G7 failing to re-ignite their economies. In other words, the greater the fears of deflation, the more will be done by central banks to avoid that scenario and, as a result, the higher the risk of inflation in the out-years, or so it is thought. (Ironically, it was this stance the Fed had in 2001-03 that arguably sowed the seed for the ensuing credit bubble.) Having said this, this thought process is logical but very subjective, with no clear right answer, in our view. But tactically, we believe it is wise to bet that the deflation scare will be more powerful a market force as the global economy falters and as central banks fight the 'icing problem'. Whether there will be inflation is a debate for another day, probably three months from now, and it will probably not be reflected in market pricing, we suspect.

Whether the dollar depreciates depends on whether investors believe that there will be runaway inflation in the US over the medium term. Our view is that the Fed will most likely have time to retract on QE in time to keep a lid on inflation. Without inflation, the dollar cannot be weakened by nominal operations, ceteris paribus. Our guess is that, while dealing with a liquidity trap is difficult, removing stimulus when macro conditions normalise should not be a major problem for the Fed. But this discussion also highlights the importance of the Fed having a credible 'exit strategy' for its QE operations. This is essentially the view of Minneapolis Fed President Gary Stern.

Further, while many are focused on this question of QE by the Fed and the dollar, we argue that the ECB will likely be forced down the same path soon. The European and the UK banking systems are just as unwilling to intermediate capital as the American banking system. The ECB and the BoE, therefore, will likely be forced to do some of the intermediation on behalf of the private sector, just as the Fed has been forced to do. So if the Fed, the ECB and the BoE adopt QE, what is the net result on EUR/USD or cable? We think it is very unclear that EUR or GBP will necessarily rally, as is presumed by some investors when they think about the Fed.

Ironically, the tug of war between deflation and inflation fears indicates a reverse Dollar Smile mechanism of sorts. Recall that our Dollar Smile framework suggests that the dollar rallies when the US economy is stronger or weaker than the rest of the world. In the intermediate state, which we call the gutter, the dollar is weak. In the deflation versus inflation debate, on the other hand, both these extremes imply a weak dollar, while the intermediate state would foster dollar strength.

The USD's Fundamental Value Undermined?

While the Fed's QE operations affect the nominal value of the dollar through inflation, the severe deterioration in the US financial system must have had an impact on the intrinsic value of the dollar. We stress again that exchange rates are a relative concept, so we need to be sensitive to how much structural damage the financial systems of other developed countries may have sustained. This also includes the fiscal burden that these countries have to take on because of this damage. Notwithstanding all the problems in the US banking system, the size of banks' balance sheet is much smaller in the US than in many other countries. For example, total bank liabilities are around 650% of GDP for Switzerland, 430% for the UK, 320% for the Euroland, 150% for Japan and 85% for the US. Investors should keep this fact in mind.

In any case, as a rough guesstimate of how the USD major index may be affected by the breakages in the US financial system and the remedial policy actions, we simulated, using our multilateral USD index fair value framework, how the major USD index might be affected by prospective changes in relative productivity, relative terms of trade, relative fiscal positions and the US NFA (net foreign asset) position. Our simulations are centred on the last two variables, as we believe that it is difficult to draw a clear link between the banking sector and relative productivity and the terms of trade.

It looks likely, based on recent developments, that the relative US fiscal position may deteriorate by 2% of GDP, and its NFA position may also deteriorate by 3% of GDP (the US C/A deficit is expected to shrink but will still be large). This scenario maps to a 5.3% depreciation in the fair value of the major USD index, according to our valuation model (the impact of NFA is small due to the small magnitude of the estimated coefficient in our model).

Bottom Line

There are two considerations in thinking about the impact of the Fed's QE operations on the dollar. First, QE per se can only affect the nominal value of the USD through relative inflation. The greater the inflationary pressures generated by QE, the more the dollar could weaken. Second, the underlying reasons why the Fed has been forced to undertake QE operations may undermine the intrinsic value of the dollar by 5-7%. Thus, while we still expect the dollar to appreciate as the global economy falters, the size of the USD rally against the majors in the next six months will likely be more modest than we had thought. Against the EM currencies, we continue to expect significant USD strength in the next six months.

作者:pirate海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com









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